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Of the many innovations in modern administrative law, the
recognition of a private right to initiate administrative action may
be the most important. In the last twenty years, courts have made
substantial inroads on principles of prosecutorial discretion, which
have traditionally shielded agency inaction from judicial review.1
For example, courts have required agencies to promulgate rules,2 to
issue regulatory standards,3 and to undertake enforcement activ-
ity.4 These rulings are part of a more general movement in public-
law doctrine, which has abandoned the traditional focus on private
autonomy in favor of an effort to ensure the identification and im-
plementation of the values set out in the governing statute.5
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The author would like to thank Bruce A.
Ackerman, Albert W. Alschuler, Douglas G. Baird, Mary E. Becker, David P. Currie, E.
Donald Elliott, Ronald Levin, Carol M. Rose, Richard Shweder, Geoffrey R. Stone, David A.
Strauss, and Peter L. Strauss for helpful comments on a previous draft. Richard A. Hertling
provided valuable research assistance.
' See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (dictum) (discussing NLRB's "unre-
viewable discretion" to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint); United Elec.
Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1026 (1967); Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 95, 97-98 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(denying mandamus to compel FTC enforcement action on grounds of executive discretion).
The unavailability of review stemmed also from restrictive standing doctrines that limited
review to those with a "legal interest." See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (re-
quiring FDA to establish aflatoxin tolerances through rulemaking); Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (judicial review of denial of
rulemaking petition available absent clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative
intent).
3 See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 61 AD. L. REP. 2D (P & F) 65, 70 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11,
1984) (holding Administrator of EPA in civil contempt for failing to make findings or issue
standards for radionuclides); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 554 F.
Supp. 242, 251 (D.D.C.) (ordering OSHA to issue emergency standard for ethyline oxide
exposure), af'd, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
" See Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers Local 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (10th
Cir. 1981) (holding mandamus available to require Secretary of Defense to enforce Davis-
Bacon Act against contractors); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (ordering -enforcement program to secure HEW enforcement of Title VI); Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding deci-
sion not to cancel registration of DDT reviewable despite permissive statutory language).
5 See JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 52 (1978) (discussing conception of the judicial
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The Supreme Court itself has had little occasion to evaluate
this trend. In Dunlop v. Bachowski,6 decided a decade ago, the
Court held that the decision of the Secretary of Labor not to file
suit to set aside a union election was subject to judicial review, but
the most difficult issue raised by the case was disposed of in an
obscure footnote.7 It was thus not until its recent decision in Heck-
ler v. Chaney" that the Court set out some general conclusions on
the reviewability of agency inaction. Those conclusions prompted a
vigorous separate opinion from Justice Marshall, who expressed
concern that the Court had created a "presumption of un-
reviewability"' that endangered "a firmly entrenched" body of law
providing judicial review of agency refusals to act.10
There is little risk in predicting that the rationale and reach of
the Chaney decision will provoke considerable controversy in the
courts and elsewhere. This article explores the implications of
Chaney for judicial review of agency enforcement decisions, at-
tempting in the process to develop a set of guidelines for resolving
claims of unlawful administrative inaction. That inquiry will be
based on an analysis of the role of regulatory agencies and review-
ing courts in the modern era.
I. REVIEWABIUTY: A PRIMER
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 11 agency ac-
tion is generally subject to judicial review. The presumption of re-
viewability is reflected in the legislative history of the APA,'12 pro-
ducing the understanding, frequently repeated by the courts, that
statutes will not be held to preclude review unless there is "clear
process as a means of achieving public or statutory values); Garland, Deregulation and Ju-
dicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REv. 505, 512 (1985) (contrasting interest-representation and fi-
delity models of administrative law). For an elaboration of this transformation, see infra
notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
' 421 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1975).
7 Id. at 567 n.7 ("We agree with the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated in its
opinion, that there is no merit in the Secretary's contention that his decision is an unreview-
able exercise of prosecutorial discretion.") (citation omitted). For a discussion of the limits
of the analogy of administrative discretion to prosecutorial discretion, see infra notes 75-122
and accompanying text.
8 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
9 Id. at 1660 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
10 Id. at 1665.
11 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
12 See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), quoted in Abbott Laborato-
ries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1967) ("To preclude judicial review under this bill a
statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convinc-
ing evidence of an intent to withhold it.").
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and convincing" evidence that Congress intended to do so.'"
The presumption of reviewability under the APA is based on a
set of considerations, loosely captured in the notion of the rule of
law, that relate to the perceived need to constrain the exercise of
discretionary power by administrative agencies. 14 Judicial review
serves important goals in promoting fidelity to statutory require-
ments and, where those requirements are ambiguous or vague, in
increasing the likelihood that the regulatory process will be a rea-
sonable exercise of discretion instead of a bow in the direction of
powerful private groups.15
These concerns are especially powerful in light of the awkward
constitutional position of the administrative agency. The absence
of the ordinary safeguards of electoral accountability and separa-
tion of powers has generated, in the administrative context, espe-
cially intense fears of factional influence over governmental
processes and of decision free from public scrutiny and review.
Such fears were a prime reason behind the nondelegation doc-
trine. 16 After the demise of that doctrine, 7 surrogate safe-
iS See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2457 (1984) ("clear
and convincing" test controls unless congressional intent to preclude review is "fairly dis-
cernible in the statutory scheme."); Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S.
444, 462 (1979); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1967).
" See Louis JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320-27 (1965). See
generally Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193,
1203 (1982) (discussing functions of the rule of law).
-5 See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33
(1983). But see R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT (1983) (criticizing certain effects of the judicial role). On agency "capture," see Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1684-87 (1975);
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1226-27.
16 It is thus unsurprising that the primary case invoking that doctrine involved a dele-
gation of government power to private groups. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See generally Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv.
L. REv. 201 (1937) (discussing advantages and dangers of participation by private groups in
the administrative process).
1" While the nondelegation doctrine has never been expressly repudiated by the Court,
it has not been used to strike down a statute since Schechter Poultry. In fact, broad legisla-
tive delegations of power to the executive branch were upheld prior to the New Deal period.
See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (upholding statute that per-
mitted executive to make regulations declaring conduct criminal as a proper delegation of
administrative power rather than an improper delegation of legislative power); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-94 (1892) (upholding Tariff Act authorization of presidential sus-
pension of favorable tariff status as not constituting grant of legislative power). Since
Schechter Poultry, the Court has often found very broad "standards" to be an adequate
basis for judicial review. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 611-15 (1980) (reviewing exercise by OSHA of power to regulate toxics "to the
extent feasible"); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420-25 (1944) (sustaining broad
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guards-judicial review prominent among them-have been devel-
oped to protect the coherence and the integrity of the regulatory
process. 18
In this regard it is important to keep in mind the fact, tradi-
tionally overlooked in discussions of judicial review of agency ac-
tion, 19 that the availability of review will often serve as an impor-
tant constraint on regulators during the decisionmaking process
long before review actually comes into play. The prospect of review
increases the likelihood of fidelity to substantive and procedural
norms-a fact that will be missed if one focuses only on the re-
ported cases, where, to be sure, the courts make their share of
mistakes.20
The concerns that support the APA's presumption of review-
ability appear no less applicable to review of inaction than to re-
view of action. Review at the behest of statutory beneficiaries may
perform a critical function in ensuring against unduly lax enforce-
ment that would violate statutory requirements. Such require-
ments may be undone through inadequate implementation as well
as through overzealous enforcement. In both contexts, judicial re-
view serves to vindicate the will of Congress as against the execu-
tive branch and may guard against the undue influence of powerful
private groups over the regulatory process.2 In the case of inac-
tion, as well as in that of action, it is appropriate to take into ac-
grant of price-fixing powers). But some Justices have indicated a renewed interest in the
doctrine. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
18 While much stress has traditionally been placed on judicial review, see, e.g., L. JAFFE,
supra note 14, at 327, it is important not to disregard the potential of nonjudicial mecha-
nisms for fulfilling these functions. See Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Consti-
tution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 150-60 (discuss-
ing legislative veto and other modes of legislative control). Nonjudicial mechanisms are
particularly crucial for assuring presidential control and interagency coordination. For im-
portant modern illustrations, see Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), and
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), which attempt to coordinate the regulatory
process through supervision by the Office of Management and Budget.
19 For criticisms of judicial review that do not discuss the phenomenon of "anticipated
reaction," CARL FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 16-18 (1937), see,
e.g., JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 8-11 (1983) (arguing that judicial review is irrel-
evant to internal agency decisionmaking, without reference to effect of prospect of review);
R. MELNICK, supra note 15, at 379-83 (discussing impact of courts on EPA solely in terms of
court-ordered action).
20 See generally R. MELNICK, supra note 15 (contending that judicial review under
Clean Air Act has had undesirable consequences for environmental policy).
'1 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct.
2856, 2870 (1983) ("that the regulated industry has eschewed a given safety device . . .
hardly constitutes cause to revoke the standard" requiring it).
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count the deterrent effect of the prospect of review on administra-
tors during the implementation process. The affirmative case for
judicial review thus appears identical in the two contexts.
On its face, moreover, the APA treats agency inaction the
same as agency action. Indeed, the statute defines agency action to
include "failure to act"2 and says that courts shall "compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 23 But it
would be a mistake to understand this language as an across-the-
board repudiation of principles of prosecutorial discretion. To un-
derstand how those principles interact with the APA, it is neces-
sary to explore the exceptions to the general rule of reviewability.
The APA provides that agency decisions are unreviewable in
two categories of cases: (1) those in which the statute precludes
review,"' and (2) those in which agency action "is committed to
agency discretion by law."2 5 The first exception is not difficult to
understand, though in particular cases it may be difficult to decide
whether there has been statutory preclusion of review. 26 The sec-
ond exception creates two puzzles. First, a conclusion that agency
action is committed to agency discretion "by law" appears sub-
stantially identical to a conclusion that a statute has precluded re-
view. Second, there is an obvious tension between the idea that
some exercises of discretion are unreviewable2 7 and the fact that
the APA allows courts to review agency action for "abuse of
discretion."28
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,29 the Su-
preme Court attempted to resolve both of these puzzles. According
to the Court, the "committed to agency discretion" exception pre-
cludes review "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' "o
This interpretation, based on the legislative history of the APA,
22 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982). The definition of agency action also includes the denial of
a rule, order, license, sanction, or other relief. Id.
23 Id. § 706(1).
24 Id. § 701(a)(1).
:5 Id. § 701(a)(2).
26 See, e.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977) (holding by a divided Court that
Attorney General's approval of reapportionment under Voting Rights Act was
unreviewable).
17 Compare Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 643, 643 (1967) (administrative arbitrariness is sometimes unreviewable), with Ber-
ger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 999 (1969) (only non-arbi-
trary use of discretion is potentially unreviewable).
28 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
29 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
1 Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
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has provoked sharp criticism.3' As we shall see, however, the
Court's interpretation is consistent with sensible understandings of
when agency action should be subject to judicial supervision.
The principal question raised by Overton Park is how one de-
cides whether, in a given case, there is "law to apply." The answer
turns on two considerations-one familiar, the other frequently ig-
nored. The familiar consideration is the governing substantive
statute, which is the major source of the "law to apply." Overton
Park itself illustrates the point. The issue there was the legality of
a decision by the Secretary of Transportation to approve the build-
ing of an interstate highway through a park in Memphis, Tennes-
see. The Court concluded that there was "law to apply" because
the statute provided that the Secretary "shall not approve" con-
struction through a public park unless "no feasible and prudent"
alternative was available. That provision imposed constraints on
the Secretary's decision by which a court might assess its legality.32
The same conclusion is appropriate with respect to the great pro-
portion of administrative law cases, at least in the context of re-
view of action. Governing statutes almost always set out standards
by which to assess the legality of agency behavior or to evaluate a
claim of arbitrariness.
The second consideration in deciding whether there is "law to
apply" is the precise allegation made by the plaintiff. The impor-
tance of this point cannot be overstated, particularly in the context
of review of agency inaction. For example, if a plaintiff claims that
an agency has taken constitutionally impermissible factors into ac-
count, there is always "law to apply"-no matter what the gov-
erning statute may say.3 Similarly, if the plaintiff alleges that the
agency's conduct has been based on factors that are irrelevant
under the governing statute, there is always law to apply, even if
the agency has especially broad discretion in weighing those factors
that are statutorily relevant.3 4 Judicial evaluation of these claims
will be equally straightforward whether the government has chosen
to take or to refrain from taking enforcement action on the basis of
these factors. On the other hand, if the plaintiff makes a genera-
lized claim of agency "arbitrariness" in failing to act, there may
sometimes be no judicially administrable standards by which to as-
31 See KENNETH CULP DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28.16, at 638-41
(1976).
32 401 U.S. at 411-13.
31 See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
3' See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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sess the claim.35 The central point is that the "law to apply" in-
quiry can be made coherent only by measuring the plaintiff's alle-
gation against the governing substantive statute. There may be
review with respect to one allegation, but no review with respect to
another, under the same statute.
Understood in these terms, the Overton Park test for review-
ability-the "law to apply" inquiry-looks very much like a deci-
sion on the merits. Once one has said that an action is unreview-
able because there are no legal constraints on the exercise of
discretion with respect to the particular allegation, one might as
well say that, with respect to that allegation, there is no legal viola-
tion. In this respect, the distinction between a conclusion that a
decision is not reviewable and a conclusion that a decision is lawful
is easy to collapse.$' In both cases, one is saying the same thing:
that the governing statute does not impose legal constraints on the
action at issue.
The APA does, however, distinguish the issue of reviewability
from that of the merits, and so long as the underlying considera-
tions are understood, the distinction need not cause significant dif-
ficulties. The important point is that agency actions are "commit-
ted to agency discretion by law" whenever the governing statute
imposes no legal constraints on the agency with respect to the par-
ticular allegation made by the plaintiff.3 7
The framework provided by Overton Park thus provides
courts with workable standards for deciding the reviewability of
both agency action and agency inaction. Since Overton Park, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have used these standards to re-
view agency enforcement decisions. 8 The mere fact that inaction is
See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
56 This point is parallel to the idea, raised in connection with the political question
doctrine, that a conclusion that a matter presents a "political question" is equivalent to a
conclusion that there is no constitutional violation on the merits. See Henkin, Is There a
"Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 606, 622-23 (1976).
37 This formulation raises the question of how one decides that it is appropriate to
dispose of a case on the merits rather than on grounds of reviewability. The decided cases
furnish no clear criteria by which to make that decision. To some extent, they suggest that
the question is to be answered on the basis of whether the statutory standard, measured
against the plaintiff's allegation, furnishes ascertainable standards by which to assess the
legal question. If it does not, a decision on reviewability grounds is more likely. See, e.g.,
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that statute provides inade-
quate standards for judicial review of FHA rental rates). To some extent, however, the deci-
sion is likely to be cast in terms of reviewability rather than the merits simply because of
tradition. But see Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(dismissing mandamus action against FTC on the merits).
11 See cases cited supra notes 2-4.
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involved is insufficient to preclude review; inaction, no less than
action, might be unlawful. The question turns on the nature of the
governing statute and of the plaintiffs allegation.
Despite Overton Park and its progeny, one might readily have
predicted that the Supreme Court would not be entirely receptive
to efforts to obtain judicial review of the enforcement decisions of
administrative agencies. In a number of areas of administrative
law, the Court has recently confined the supervisory role of the
federal courts, especially in suits brought by the beneficiaries of
regulatory statutes. For example, the Court has held that federal
courts may not impose procedural requirements on administrative
agencies beyond those set out in the APA.39 The Court also has
slightly weakened the ordinary presumption of reviewability of
agency action by lowering the standard required to demonstrate
congressional intent to preclude judicial review.40 In addition, the
Court has stated that courts should accord considerable deference
to executive constructions of regulatory statutes whenever "Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue. 41
Finally, the Court has indirectly limited the role of judicial review
through the doctrine of standing. In a decision of particular impor-
tance, the Court held that parents of children attending segregated
schools did not have standing to challenge the failure of the IRS to
deny tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated on
the basis of race.42 Relying in part on the "take Care" clause,48 the
Court concluded that separation-of-powers concerns require plain-
tiffs seeking a "restructuring" of executive-branch operations to
"I Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 544-46 (1978) (rejecting judicial addition of procedural requirements for APA
informal rulemaking).
0 Compare Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2456-58 (1984) (in-
tent to preclude review must be "fairly discernible" from legislative scheme), with Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (requiring "clear and convincing evi-
dence" of intent to preclude review).
41 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
2778, 2782 (1984); see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 1102, 1108, 1110 (1985) (requiring clear, unambiguous expression of intent con-
trary to that of agency). Decisions of this sort may herald a quite general return to a varia-
tion of "formalism" in statutory interpretation. For critical appraisals of the "formalist"
approach, see Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1199-1201, 1220-32; Note, Intent, Clear
Statements, and the Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 892, 899-907 (1982). For a defense, see
Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. P. L. REv. 549, 582-92
(1985).
42 Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
43 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the Executive shall "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed").
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meet especially stringent standing requirements."'
This is not to say that the recent cases form an unbroken line
of deference to executive authority. In one case, the Court applied
the "hard-look" doctrine45 with considerable rigor, overturning an
administrative decision to rescind an existing regulatory stan-
dard."6 And elsewhere the Court has shown a willingness to super-
vise the regulatory process with some care.' But the basic pattern
is unmistakable. The Court's decisions reflect skepticism about the
appropriateness of judicial supervision of the regulatory process at
the behest of statutory beneficiaries. 8 Such skepticism has re-
sulted in a willingness either to deny review entirely or to restrict
its scope, often through "clear statement" principles of statutory
construction. 49 It was against this background that the Supreme
Court decided Heckler v. Chaney.
II. THE Chaney DECISION
The Chaney case involved a suit by inmates on death row to
require the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforce-
mept action to prevent particular drugs from being used in execu-
tions by lethal injection.50 The FDA had approved the drugs at
issue for some purposes, but not for use in executions. The inmates
contended that the drugs had not been tested and labeled for use
in human executions and that in the hands of untrained personnel
the drugs would cause "torturous pain" rather than the intended
quick and painless death.5 1 According to the inmates, the use of
the drugs in human execution thus violated the "misbranding" and
" 104 S. Ct. at 3330. For a critical appraisal, see Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Com-
ment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985).
41 For discussion of the doctrine, see Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See generally Sunstein, De-
regulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 177, 181-82 (collecting cases).
4' Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2862 (1983).
47 See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 658-59 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (rejecting OSHA benzene standard after "a more detailed examination of
the record than is customary").
48 For suggestions that this skepticism is misplaced, at least if the judicial role is suita-
bly cabined, see Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1316-22; L. JAFFE, supra note 14, at
320-27, 589-92. Most of the recent cases restricting the judicial role involved suits by benefi-
ciaries, and the restrictions on the law of standing and reviewability will primarily affect
beneficiaries rather than regulated entities. It remains uncertain whether the Court will
similarly limit judicial power when the plaintiff is a member of the regulated class.
4' See supra note 41.
50 105 S. Ct. at 1651-52. The requested enforcement actions were detailed in the opin-
ion below, Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
51 718 F.2d at 1177.
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"new drug" provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.2 The
FDA had declined to act, claiming that it did not have jurisdiction
over the use of drugs for human execution s and that, even if it
did, it had the "'inherent discretion'" not to act unless there was
"'a serious danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to de-
fraud.' 54 According to the FDA, neither of the conditions that
would require action was present in Chaney.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held
that the FDA's inaction was an unreviewable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.5 5 In thus reversing the decision of the
court of appeals, the Court said that there was often "no law to
apply" to enforcement decisions. Such decisions should therefore
be presumed unreviewable under the "committed to agency discre-
tion" exception to the general rule of reviewability under the
APA.56
The Court marshaled four considerations in favor of this con-
clusion. First, it said that because of limited administrative re-
sources, agencies must evaluate a wide range of factors in setting
enforcement priorities and that such decisions are ill-suited to ju-
dicial review.57 Second, it observed that "when an agency refuses
to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an indi-
vidual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon
areas that courts often are called upon to protect." 8 Third, it indi-
cated that inaction, unlike action, does not provide a focus for ju-
dicial review.59 Fourth, it said that "an agency's refusal to institute
proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the deci-
sion of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict"-a de-
cision that, the Court noted, is entrusted to the executive under
the "take Care" clause of article II0
In the Court's view, these considerations were sufficient to jus-
tify a "conclusion that an agency's decision not to take enforce-
ment action should be presumed immune from judicial review." '
But the Court emphasized that the presumption could be rebutted
52 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f), 355 (1982).
3 105 S. Ct. at 1652.
"Id. (quoting statement by FDA Commissioner).
:5 Id. at 1659.
6 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
:7 105 S. Ct. at 1656.
8 Id. (emphasis in original).
59 Id.
60 Id. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text (evaluating the "executive func-
tion" argument).
1 105 S. Ct. at 1656.
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"where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the
agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. ' 62 The
Court found that the presumption of unreviewability had not been
rebutted in Chaney because the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act pro-
vided no statutory constraints on the exercise of discretion. 3 The
Court distinguished Dunlop v. Bachowski 4 on this ground. In that
case, the Court said, the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act required the Secretary of Labor to file suit if certain
"clearly defined" factors were present, and this requirement was
an adequate basis for judicial review. 5
The result in Chaney is easy to defend. The FDA's failure to
investigate the unapproved use of the drugs was not constrained
by the governing statute. There were various possible sources of
statutory and regulatory "law" in Chaney, but the Court was prob-
ably correct in concluding that none formed a sufficient basis for
judicial review. The court of appeals had relied on a policy state-
ment indicating that the agency considered itself "obligated" to act
against unapproved uses of approved drugs,6 but the statement
was ambiguous and was in any event appended to a rule that the
agency never adopted. 7 The plaintiffs had also invoked a provision
in the substantive statute stating that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services need not prosecute "minor violations" if she "be-
lieves that the public interest will be adequately served by a suita-
ble written notice. '68 They argued for the negative implication that
this provision was intended to require prosecution of "major" vio-
lations. But the Supreme Court read the provision as applicable to
situations in which a violation had already been established to the
agency's satisfaction, not as an effort to require investigation of
possible violations.6 9 Furthermore, the plaintiff's allegations did
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1658-59.
421 U.S. 560 (1975).
65 105 S. Ct. at 1657. This was not an accurate reading of the understanding of the
Court in Dunlop itself. In Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 567 n.7 (quoted supra note 7), the Court
endorsed the reasoning of the lower court, which had said that principles of prosecutorial
discretion should operate as a bar to review only when the interests represented by plaintiffs
were those of the public as a whole (as in the case of a criminal prosecution), rather than
those of identifiable individuals, Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 1974). Of
course, Chaney itself involved the interests of identifiable individuals.
66 Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
67 105 S. Ct. at 1658. The court of appeals had suggested that the fact that the rule was
not adopted was "not decisive" and that the statement itself constituted a "rule" under the
APA. 718 F.2d at 1186 & n.28.
6 21 U.S.C. § 336 (1982) (quoted in Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1659).
69 105 S. Ct. at 1659.
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not indicate specific deficiencies in agency decisionmaking that dis-
tinguished their claim from that of many others who could assert
an interest in how the FDA's investigatory authority is used.70 The
plaintiffs were thus left with precisely the kind of generalized
claim of "arbitrariness" that is often so difficult to sustain.7 1
On all this the Court was unanimous. The controversial char-
acter of the decision stems from the adoption of a seemingly broad
presumption against review of enforcement decisions. Justice
Brennan issued a short concurrence, noting that the majority opin-
ion left open the possibility that agency inaction might be review-
able in a wide variety of circumstances.72 In an extensive separate
concurrence, Justice Marshall took issue with the Court's creation
of a "presumption of unreviewability" for enforcement decisions.
In his view, decisions not to act will frequently survive on the mer-
its, largely for the reasons identified by the Court. But that conclu-
sion should not imply a refusal to review the particular bases for
inaction-review that will generally serve as a safeguard against
"caprice and lawlessness. '7 3 In Justice Marshall's view, the tradi-
tional principles of prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with
"one of the very purposes fueling the birth of administrative agen-
cies"-the "reality that governmental refusal to act could have just
as devastating an effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness as coercive governmental action." 74 The FDA's conduct in
Chaney, according to Justice Marshall, was lawful only because it
was reasonable on the merits.
70 Such deficiencies would require special allegations-for example, a claim that agency
inaction was based on constitutionally or statutorily irrelevant factors, see infra notes 129-
32, 135-40 and accompanying text, or a showing that the inaction involved a matter that,
because of the nature of the private conduct at issue, had a special claim on the agency's
resources.
71 This is not to say that the case was quite as easy as the Court seems to have
thought. A response to the foregoing line of reasoning might be that the Court should have
looked more carefully at the nature of the plaintiffs' claim and at the FDA's enforcement
priorities, in order to assure itself that the allocation of limited resources was reasonable in
light of the various options before the agency. But such an examination is, in the absence of
unusual circumstances, extremely difficult for a court to undertake. In light of the nature of
the statute and the allegation, a posture of deference was appropriate.
72 105 S. Ct. at 1659-60 (Brennan, J., concurring).
73 Id. at 1665 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
7" Id. at 1666. In constitutional law, this perception is reflected in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (suggesting that government refusal to enact minimum
wage law would amount to government subsidy to employers), and Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (describing governmental inaction as "none the less a choice"). See
infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
[52:653
Agency Inaction
III. THE LIMITS OF "PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION" IN THE
REGULATORY STATE
The Chaney Court's presumption against judicial review of
agency enforcement decisions is based on principles of
"prosecutorial discretion." Prosecutorial discretion has tradition-
ally been thought to immunize decisions of criminal prosecutors
from judicial review;75 it has sometimes been extended to the ad-
ministrative context, shielding agency inaction from legal control.7
As Justice Marshall emphasized in Chaney, these principles are at
odds with the general presumption of reviewability.
Judicial control of agency inaction has its origins in the law of
mandamus, which allows courts to compel "nondiscretionary"
agency decisions."7 In an early case, however, the Supreme Court
held that the federal courts had no general mandamus authority.7
That authority has now been conferred on the courts by statute,9
but "discretionary" decisions are immunized from judicial review.80
This state of affairs, in conjunction with standing limitations,"" ex-
plains why judicial review of agency inaction has generally oc-
curred under the APA rather than the federal mandamus statute.8 2
Under the APA, however, the Chaney Court's invocation of
prosecutorial discretion does not justify the adoption of a pre-
sumption against review. This conclusion becomes apparent by
scrutinizing the four central considerations on which refusal to re-
view agency inaction is based: judicial solicitude for private rights,
deference to executive discretion, the existence of alternative reme-
dies, and various prudential concerns. Whatever their original
merit, these considerations no longer carry significant weight.83
71 See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1973). For a discussion and critique of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context, see
KENNETH CULp DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-214 (1969).
7 See cases cited supra note 1.
77 See generally L. JAX', supra note 14, at 178-92.
78 McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
79 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982).
80 Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930).
sl See infra note 87.
82 But see Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers Local 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564
(10th Cir. 1981) (holding mandamus available under Davis-Bacon Act).
13 For additional treatment of some of these considerations, see Stewart & Sunstein,
supra note 14, at 1202-20 (discussing traditional concepts as obstacle to development of
judicial remedies for administrative misconduct); Note, Judicial Review of Administrative
Inaction, 83 COLUP L. Rav. 627, 630-38 (1983) (discounting traditional obstacles to review).
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A. Judicial Solicitude for Private Rights
The original role of judicial review of administrative conduct
was based on two related understandings. The first was that mar-
ket ordering within the constraints of the common law was normal
and natural.8 4 In light of this assumption, government intervention
in the market appeared exceptional and was subject to special ju-
dicial control. For this reason, courts adopted what was in effect a
one-way ratchet, consisting of legally enforceable constraints on
regulation but no such constraints on inaction."5 The second un-
derstanding was that the purpose of judicial review was to safe-
guard traditional private rights as defined by the common law.86
The interests of those who were likely to benefit from administra-
tive action were not traditional liberty or property interests and
were thus not entitled to judicial protection. 7 The political process
8 4 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (reflecting a similar understand-
ing), with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (rejecting this understanding).
Il Indeed, the very concepts of "inaction" and "action" are coherent only if one has a
background understanding of the normal or desirable functions of government. Cf. LAU-
RENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHoicEs 246-48 (1985) (discussing dependence of notion of
"state action" on Lochner-like understandings of private and public spheres); Brest, State
Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1296, 1297-99 (1982) (same). See also Justice Frankfurter's suggestion, in interpreting the
"negative order" doctrine, that
"negative order" and "affirmative order" are not appropriate terms of art. "Nega-
tive" has really been an obfuscating adjective in that it implied a search for a distinc-
tion-nonaction as against action-which does not involve the real considerations on
which rest, as we have seen, the reviewability of Commission orders within the frame-
work of its discretionary authority and within the general criteria of justiciability.
"Negative" and "affirmative," in the context of these problems, is as unilluminating
and mischief-making a distinction as the outmoded line between "nonfeasance" and
"malfeasance."
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 140-42 (1939) (citations omitted).
8 See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1671-76.
8 This notion was most important under the law of standing, where early cases in-
volved claims of competitive disadvantage as a result of government action; standing was
denied because of failure to allege violation of a "legal right" or "protected interest." See,
e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1938). See generally Stewart, supra
note 15, at 1723-24 (recognized "legal rights" were common law contract and property
rights). With the rejection of the "legal interest" test, see, e.g., Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Orgs., Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 & n.1 (1970) (competitor standing),
standing was broadened to include the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, see, e.g., Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1970) (tenant-farmer beneficiaries of upland-cotton pro-
gram). Since a wide range of beneficiary injuries have been held to be "fairly traceable" to
government conduct and to satisfy the "injury in fact" test, see, e.g., Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1978) (local citizens have
standing to challenge the effect of federal liability limit on the building of nuclear power
plants), standing is a barrier to beneficiary actions in much more limited circumstances. But
cf. Allen v. Wright, 104 U.S. 3315, 3329-30, 3333 (1984) (holding plaintiffs' claim of injury to
strict causality standard where special circumstances raise separation-of-powers concerns).
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was seen as the appropriate safeguard against unlawful inaction,
especially since large numbers of people were often affected by
failure to act.88 Together, these two understandings represent a
Lochner-like view of the judicial role. 9 The Lochner Court, too,
saw the judicial role as the vindication of private rights, defined by
reference to market ordering within the common law, against gov-
ernment "intervention."
With the rise of the regulatory state, however, this Lochner-
era approach to judicial review of administrative inaction is no
longer tenable. And it should be unsurprising to find that this view
arose and declined in constitutional and administrative law in par-
allel fashion.90 In the constitutional context, the Court recognized
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish91 that common law ordering was in
no sense "natural," but was the product of governmental choice:
both action and inaction amount to decisions. It was pursuant to
this view that a failure to act might be seen as, in the Court's
words, a "subsidy" to those who benefited from the inaction. Simi-
larly, in the administrative context, the notion that judicial review
is limited in purpose to safeguarding traditional private rights and
in scope to the promotion of traditional private autonomy has be-
come unacceptable.
This doctrinal shift is reflected in changes in three related as-
pects of administrative law, changes which undermine the Loch-
ner-like deference to agency inaction. The first of these changes is
the growth of public rights. The creation of administrative agencies
was based on an understanding that interests unrecognized by the
common law nonetheless merit governmental protection.9 2 Regula-
8s Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (due
process does not require individual hearings for determinations that affect large numbers of
people, in part on ground that legislature is the appropriate forum for redress).
8, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Litigation, 89 H.ARv. L. REv. 1685, 1746-48 (1976) (discussing theory of "natu-
ralness" of economic interaction under common law).
90 See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming).
91 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
" This conclusion was alternately based on (1) the notion that the common law cata-
logue of private rights was insufficient to protect private autonomy, and that new rights
should be added to the list; (2) a conclusion that important decisions ought to be subject to
collective control in the service of democratic ends of self-government; or (3) an economic
rationale pointing to the externalities not taken care of by an unregulated market. See gen-
erally Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1235-39 (discussing the entitlement, produc-
tion, and public value accounts of the rise of administrative regulation). At times, of course,
the creation of a regulatory scheme might be understood as an interest-group deal. See Stig-
ler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BLL J. EcoN. & MGmr. SCL 3 (1971).
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tory interests, representing public "rights," 3 are created by con-
gressional or administrative action and are entitled to judicial pro-
tection under the APA. The fact that inaction does not affect
traditional private rights is therefore an insufficient basis for dis-
tinguishing between action and inaction.
The second change is in the law of standing. It is no longer
necessary to show a traditional private right in order to obtain re-
view of agency conduct;94 beneficiaries of regulatory programs may
bring suit if they can show "injury in fact" and demonstrate that a
judicial decree will remedy the harm alleged. 5 Private autonomy,
as it was understood at common law, need not be involved at all.
The third change is authorization of judicial review of agency
action by the APA. Under the APA, the function of judicial review
is to ensure governmental conformity with legal requirements,
whether such requirements require or forbid regulation.9 6 This
conformity is to be achieved in two ways. First, courts are charged
with promoting adherence to the governing statute-with adher-
ence understood to include identification and implementation of
the values set out in that statute. Statutorily irrelevant factors
may not be considered,97 and those factors made relevant by stat-
ute must be taken into account.9 " Second, where the statute is am-
biguous, as is frequently the case, courts must ensure that there
has been a reasoned exercise of discretion on the part of adminis-
trators.99 These purposes apply with equal force to action and
93 It may be misleading to treat such interests as "rights" at all. See Mashaw, "Rights"
in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1173 (1983) (discussing "rights" as
epiphenomena of political choice under "statist" concept of administrative law); Stewart,
Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537,
1556-59 (1983) (discussing limits of entitlement conception of regulation).
" This was the traditional requirement of the "legal interest" test. See supra note 87.
See generally J. VINNG, supra note 5, at 20-33 (discussing the test and its limits); Stewart,
supra note 15, at 1723-25 (discussing the traditional standing model).
" This is something of an oversimplification of current doctrine. See supra note 87; cf.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (suggesting that a "zone of interests" requirement may also be an ele-
ment of current standing doctrine under article III).
96 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2866
(1983) ("[T]he direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter the standard of
judicial review established by law.").
See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
"The notion of reasoned decisionmaking has often been invoked by courts in recent
years. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856,
2874 (1983); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413,
1425-26 (D.C. Cir. 1983); NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1982). That notion
has three components. First, regulatory decisions should be based on a detailed inquiry into
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inaction.
Moreover, the availability of political remedies does not, as a
general rule, distinguish inaction from action. The possibility of
political redress has not been thought sufficient to justify the elim-
ination of judicial review of agency action. 00 The same conclusion
is properly reached in the context of inaction. Often political reme-
dies are more readily used by well-organized members of regulated
classes than by regulatory beneficiaries, who must overcome sub-
stantial barriers to the exercise of political power.10 1 At least in
some contexts, differential access to the political process may well
make judicial review of agency inaction a particularly necessary
safeguard.
B. Reviewing Discretion and Usurpation of the Executive
Function
Reluctance to review inaction has traditionally been based in
part on a set of considerations counseling against judicial usurpa-
tion of the executive function. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested
that a court engaging in judicial review of executive inaction or
issuing an order compelling an agency to act would be undertaking
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 1°-2-an execu-
tive rather than a judicial task. 03 The suggestion is based on the
understanding that enforcement activity is entrusted to the execu-
the advantages and disadvantages of proposed courses of action. Second, issues involving
values must be resolved in accordance with the governing statute. Sometimes that statute
will require consideration of particular factors; sometimes it will exclude consideration of
other factors; and sometimes it will indicate that some factors, although relevant, are of
secondary importance. Third, to the extent that issues of value are to be resolved through
an exercise of discretion by administrators within the confines of the statute, it is important
to ensure that the relevant considerations-and the actual bases for decision-are explicitly
identified, are subject to public scrutiny and review, and reflect a reasonable weighing of the
relevant factors. See Sunstein, supra note 45, at 181-82 (collecting cases).
100 The reason lies in the fact that political remedies are too crude to be a reliable basis
for preventing or redressing unauthorized or arbitrary regulatory action. Cf. R. LrrAN & W.
NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 60-81 (1983) (discussing the imperfections of
congressional and presidential control of bureaucracy).
101 See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1983); cf. Fiorina, Legislative
Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33,
49 (1982) (suggesting that legislators, concerned with reelection, will be most likely to dele-
gate responsibility when regulation has diffuse rather than concentrated benefits).
... U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 3.
103 See Note, Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial Review under Title IV
of the LMRDA: A Proposal for Administrative Reform, 86 YALE L.J. 885, 901-02 (1977); see
also Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3330 (1984) (using "take Care" clause as a basis for
denying standing to claimants objecting to alleged IRS failure to deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools).
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tive, not to the courts, and that judicial involvement-in the form
of a decree compelling prosecution-would violate the separation
of powers. While this basic understanding is correct, the conclusion
does not follow. The "take Care" clause is a duty, not a license; it
imposes an obligation on the President to enforce duly enacted
laws. If judicial involvement is based on a statutory violation by
the executive, review promotes rather than undermines the separa-
tion of powers, for it helps to prevent the executive branch from
ignoring congressional directives.10 4
This is not to deny that the executive has the power to set
enforcement priorities and to allocate resources to those problems
that, in the judgment of the executive, seem most severe.105 Con-
gress frequently appropriates a smaller amount than would be nec-
essary to redress all private violations of the law, in the expecta-
tion that the executive will use its discretion to allocate funds to
the most pressing problems. Exercising discretion in this way is or-
dinarily consistent with congressional will. But there is a distinc-
tion between exercising such discretion and refusing to carry out
obligations that Congress has imposed on the executive. The dis-
tinction turns, here as elsewhere, on interpretation of the substan-
tive statute. Although there will be difficult intermediate cases, the
"take Care" clause does not authorize the executive to fail to en-
force those laws of which it disapproves.10 6
Sometimes the separation-of-powers objections to review of
agency inaction are supplemented with a reference to the remedial
problems that may result whenever a court requires someone to
act.10 The executive may, for example, simply refuse; or it may
decide to acquiesce in the court's ruling by bringing an enforce-
ment proceeding, but do so without much vigor. Any judicial reme-
dies for such executive misconduct, it might be thought, would
constitute impermissible judicial entanglement in the executive
I" Accord Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3348 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rely-
ing on power of courts to say "what the law is"); see also Nichol, supra note 44.
105 See Easterbrook, On Not Enforcing the Law, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 14-16.
106 The parallel here is to the impoundment controversy, which arose when President
Nixon asserted an authority to decline to spend funds appropriated by Congress. That as-
sertion was properly rejected. See Mikva & Hertz, Impoundment of Funds-The Courts,
the Congress, and the President: A Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw. UJL. REv. 335 (1974).
107 This debate has focused on the question of whether courts would be required to
undertake the management of institutions whose policies they sought to reform. Compare
Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HAv. L. RE V. 4, 40-42
(1984) (arguing that granting standing in Allen v. Wright would have in effect required
judicial management of IRS), with Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Eco-
nomic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REV. 592, 603-04 (1985) (denying same).
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function. The principal answer to such objections is that they as-
sume intransigence on the part of the executive in the face of a
court order, an assumption that is inconsistent with the general
willingness of executive officials to obey the law as it has been in-
terpreted by the courts.108 Moreover, the defendants in these cases
are institutions, not individuals; the people who are assigned the
task of bringing the court-ordered enforcement proceedings may
well not object to them. Finally, the same objections are applicable
to the wide range of cases requiring action by state officials in the
last quarter-century and have no more force here than there.
In the early period of administrative law, these concerns were
more forceful in light of the fact that courts had not developed
techniques to review the exercise of discretion on the part of ad-
ministrators. Because courts lacked methods to review discretion
without usurping it, review of inaction threatened to transform
courts into prosecutors. The absence of such techniques buttressed
traditional separation-of-powers concerns about judicial review of
agency inaction. But the modern period has seen the rise of a num-
ber of strategies by which courts might review the exercise of dis-
cretion without usurping the executive function. Courts may re-
quire explanations for decisions,10 9 and in reviewing those
explanations, they may be quite deferential. The "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review under the APA, 110 for example, au-
thorizes review of discretion in order to assure reasoned decision-
making within the confines of a statute.' That standard, properly
applied, does not involve usurpation of the executive function.
C. Alternative Remedies
As a historical matter, the pressure for judicial review of
prosecutorial decisions was relieved by the existence of alternative
remedies by which to enforce the law if the prosecutor failed to
act. Indeed, the notion of prosecutorial discretion developed in
large part because of the availability of private prosecution." 2
Moreover, common law remedies were traditionally available for
108 In the school-desegregation area, for example, courts have ordered action by execu-
tive officials, generally without having to usurp executive functions. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
,09 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856,
2871-74 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
110 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
See supra note 99.
See Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHL L. REv.
439, 443-46 (1974).
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the same harms that were redressed by criminal prosecutors.
These considerations carry much less force in the modern pe-
riod. In general, affected citizens have no right to proceed directly
against the private person whose conduct violates a statutory stan-
dard. The modern Court's skeptical attitude toward implied causes
of action'1 3 has guaranteed this result. Even if it is available, a pri-
vate right of action is often an inadequate surrogate remedy.'14
D. Prudential Concerns
The final consideration is that review of inaction imposes
unique burdens on courts. Agencies are almost always funded at
levels that prevent them from redressing all violations of the law.
A decision not to act is a choice of how to allocate these limited
resources. This decision turns not only on the legality of the pri-
vate conduct, but also on a wide variety of managerial considera-
tions that are not well suited to judicial review. 1 5 A decision not to
act may be based on competing priorities, the desire to establish
favorable precedents in an orderly fashion, the reaction of the pub-
lic and of relevant officials in Congress and the executive branch,
and so forth. When a plaintiff alleges that an agency has acted "ar-
bitrarily" in failing to take action in a particular case, the court
must consult all of these factors in order to make a reasoned deci-
sion. The fact of resource constraints thus makes review of
prosecutorial decisions different from review of ordinary adminis-
trative action.
This consideration might be buttressed with other institu-
tional concerns. Inaction may be the result of delay in agency deci-
sionmaking rather than evidence of a decision not to act."" Again,
in light of budgetary constraints, failure to act is more frequent
113 See, e.g., Universities Research Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (no implied
employee right of action for back wages absent administrative determination that Davis-
Bacon Act applies); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-25
(1979) (no implied right of action for monetary relief where statute contains express en-
forcement mechanisms); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-71 (1979) (no
implied right of action against accountant performing audit required by statute). But see
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) (granting implied right of
action under Title IX in part because statute passed during period when Congress would
have expected Court to imply cause of action).
114 Cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1305, 1312-13 (arguing that private rights
of action are inappropriate under some regulatory statutes).
I' See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 394-404
(1978) (discussing "polycentric" questions not readily susceptible to judicial resolution).
116 The fact that there may be no decision at all raises questions of ripeness and final-
ity. See Note, supra note 83, at 647 & n.131, 652-55, 683-84.
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than action.1 7 Decisions not to act are likely to have been reached
informally"" and will often be unaccompanied by a record that a
court might examine to assess the legality of the agency's conduct.
If judicial review were available, it might become necessary to for-
malize inaction decisions, a step that could have considerable costs.
These considerations do serve to distinguish action from inac-
tion, and they must be taken into account. Most important, the
breadth of the considerations that may lawfully be considered by
an administrative prosecutor suggests that judicially administrable
standards are less likely to be available for assessing a plaintiff's
claim. Consider, for example, an allegation by a consumer that the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) acted unlawfully in failing to in-
itiate proceedings against a particular advertiser. Suppose that the
ground of the complaint is that the advertisement is deceptive and
misleading within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, or indeed that it is especially so and should be a high priority
for the agency. In order to assess that claim, the court must evalu-
ate the FTC's enforcement program to see where the advertise-
ment in question "fits" in light of competing priorities. That in-
quiry must be undertaken without statutory guidance. In general
there is "no law to apply" to such an allegation.
The matter may be different if the private conduct at issue
can be shown to be especially egregious, or if the plaintiff is able to
demonstrate that inaction is based on unconstitutional or statuto-
rily irrelevant considerations. 119 But a generalized allegation of ar-
bitrariness will often be an insufficient basis for judicial review.
The other institutional concerns, which stress the informal
character of inaction decisions, carry less weight. The courts have
developed a number of techniques by which to review informal ac-
117 This point raises the concern that the creation of private rights to initiate regula-
tory action might impose significant burdens on the federal courts. Cf. RICHARD POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-166 (1985) (discussing caseload explosion). But
initiating litigation against the government is expensive, and experience suggests that the
incremental increase in litigation would be insubstantial. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9:5, at 229-35 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that a mandatory en-
forcement system can be viable); Dimento, Citizen Environmental Legislation in the
States: An Overview, 53 J. URB. L. 413 (1976) (examining the effect of state environmental
citizen suit provisions); Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pace, 9 HARV.
ENv. L. REv. 23 (1985) (examining the effect of federal environmental citizen suit provi-
sions). Of course, it is by no means clear that it would be undesirable to increase the federal
caseload if the increase produces greater administrative compliance with the APA and gov-
erning substantive statutes.
118 "Informal" decisionmaking here means the use of methods that, while reviewable
under the APA, are not subjected to special procedural requirements by the APA.
I"8 See infra notes 129-32, 135-40 and accompanying text.
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tion,120 so long as the various other prerequisites for re-
view-finality, standing, ripeness, exhaustion-are satisfied. In this
regard, inaction does not stand on a substantially different footing
from action. While the frequently informal character of such deci-
sions must be taken into account in conducting review, it does not
justify a presumption against review.
It follows from this discussion that it is no longer possible to
justify a general rule that enforcement decisions are unreviewable.
To say this is hardly to say that inaction will often be found un-
lawful on the merits; it is not even to say that inaction is always
reviewable. But it is to say that enforcement decisions should be
subject to the same principles governing reviewability as are ap-
plied to other administrative decisions, formal and informal. Those
general principles, it will be recalled, make the availability of re-
view turn on an assessment of whether the statutory standards,
measured against the plaintiff's allegation, furnish law that courts
might apply to assess the claim.
To be sure, the distinctive features of inaction decisions-the
numerous factors that must be taken into account-will mean that
claims of arbitrariness are often an insufficient basis for judicial
review. But claims of other sorts might well be enough to provide
justiciable standards. 2' In short, the application of generalized no-
tions of prosecutorial discretion to the administrative context is
often inappropriate, for the force of the considerations supporting
deference to prosecutorial discretion will vary substantially with
the statutory scheme and the plaintiff's allegation. The concept of
prosecutorial discretion should, in this light, be understood as a
metaphor that tends to conceal the underlying reasons for and
against review in particular contexts.
These considerations suggest that the Chaney Court's reason-
ing was unpersuasive insofar as it indicated a general rule that in-
action ought to be treated differently from other agency decisions.
The "take Care" clause does not justify special judicial deference if
the administrator's failure to act is in violation of duly enacted
laws. The analogy to the discretion of the criminal prosecutor is
largely unavailing. The fact that inaction does not appear "coer-
cive" is also an unpersuasive distinction; unlawful governmental
failure to act can be as harmful as unlawful action and is equally
120 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (re-
quiring Secretary of Transportation to provide statement of reasons for informal decision in
order to establish basis for judicial review).
21 See infra notes 123-55 and accompanying text.
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subject to judicial review under APA standards. And while inaction
may not involve traditional property or liberty interests, the exis-
tence of a constitutionally protected interest is not a necessary
predicate for the invocation of judicial review.
Of course, failure to act may be based on limited prosecutorial
resources, and that factor provides an important consideration in
evaluating claims of unlawful agency inaction. But the problem of
limited resources does not justify a broad rule immunizing inaction
from judicial review. Whether these institutional concerns carry
force depends, as always, on the relationship between the statutory
standard and the plaintiff's allegation. For example, an allegation
that the FDA had failed to act because of a bribe from state offi-
cials seeking to use the drugs in question to administer the death
penalty would be reviewable' 22-no matter how many competing
priorities one could find before the agency, and no matter how
sparse the record.
IV. THE LIMITS OF Chaney: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
It would probably be a mistake to read Chaney as establishing
a general rule of nonreviewability for enforcement decisions. The
opinion is filled with more than the usual number of disclaimers.
The Court expressly puts to one side the following cases: (1) review
of a refusal to undertake rulemaking; 123 (2) inaction based on a
conclusion that statutory jurisdiction is lacking;124 (3) cases in
which an "agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a general
policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its stat-
utory responsibilities"; 125 (4) refusal to enforce properly adopted
agency rules;12 6 (5) nonenforcement that violates constitutional
rights;127 and-the catch-all category-(6) cases in which the gov-
erning substantive statute sets priorities or circumscribes "an
agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pur-
sue. 1 28 The breadth of the decision will depend on how cases fall-
ing in these categories are treated, and how large the categories are
12" Cf. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-250 (1980) ("A scheme injecting a
personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant
or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise serious
constitutional questions.").
123 105 S. Ct. at 1652 n.2.
"' Id. at 1656 n.4.
125 Id. (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
" 105 S. Ct. at 1658.
"' Id. at 1659.
128 Id. at 1657.
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themselves said to be.
Chaney thus leaves unanswered a number of questions. The
answers to those questions will determine the fate of the private
right to initiate administrative proceedings. This section discusses
the various categories left open in Chaney, in descending order of
the strength of the case for review of inaction.
A. Inaction Based on Constitutionally Impermissible Factors
If agency inaction is based on constitutionally impermissible
factors, such as race or exercise of first amendment rights, there is
"law to apply" and the failure to act, or selective action, is review-
able. 129 Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff contends that an
agency has failed to bring an enforcement proceeding because the
potential defendants are white, or because the defendants were
willing to waive their right to free speech in exchange for immunity
from prosecution. In such cases, there are judicially administrable
standards by which to evaluate the plaintiff's allegation; the Con-
stitution furnishes the relevant constraints.1 30 A case decided the
day before Chaney reflects the same point by subjecting the discre-
tion of criminal prosecutors to constitutional constraints.' The
remedial issue may turn out to be troublesome, 32 but the issue of
reviewability is not.
B. Inaction Based on Asserted Absence of Statutory Jurisdiction
In a case decided over two decades ago, the Supreme Court
made clear that review is generally available when an agency's fail-
ure to act depends on a conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over a
particular class of cases. 13 3 The underlying reason is clear and
129 The APA requires reviewing courts to set aside agency actions found to be "con-
trary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1982).
130 Cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943) (indi-
cating in dictum that constitutional questions are exceptions to rule that agency decisions
are unreviewable); Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (5th Cir. 1983)
(same), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2385 (1984); United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1366
(5th Cir. 1969) (same); Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949) (district court has
jurisdiction to review NLRB certification decision if plaintiff raises constitutional question
that is "not transparently frivolous").
"1 See Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 1531 (1985) (subjecting selective prose-
cution of vocal draft resisters to review for first and fifth amendment violations).
1'2 The problem arises from the awkwardness of one possible remedy-compelling
prosecution. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
133 Office Employes Int'l Union Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 318-20 (1957); see also
Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1983) (court can review
agency methods of enforcement where Congress determined how the rights it created should
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straightforward. Assume, for example, that the FDA had declined
to act in Chaney on the sole ground that the governing substantive
statute did not authorize the FDA to regulate the unapproved use
of approved drugs. If the plaintiffs challenged that jurisdictional
conclusion, the court could review the conclusion on the basis of
"law"-that is, the governing statute. Allocation of scarce
prosecutorial resources is not an issue-even if the agency may de-
cide, after the issue of statutory jurisdiction has been resolved, not
to bring enforcement proceedings notwithstanding its power to do
SO.'13 The considerations invoked in Chaney are thus inapplicable
to questions of statutory jurisdiction. This conclusion follows natu-
rally from the Court's statement that review of inaction is available
when Congress has imposed constraints on enforcement discretion.
C. Inaction Based on Statutorily Irrelevant Factors or Otherwise
in Violation of Statutory Constraints on Enforcement
Discretion
Suppose a plaintiff alleges that agency inaction is based on a
factor that is not relevant under the governing statute. For exam-
ple, the claim may be that nonenforcement resulted from a bribe 35
or, to take a less extreme case, that an agency decided not to act
because of the costs of regulation in a case in which costs are not a
relevant consideration under the statute.136 The most important
exception in Chaney becomes relevant here. It will be recalled that
the Court endorsed review of agency enforcement decisions when
the governing statute "provided guidelines for the agency to follow
in exercising its enforcement powers.'13 7 Whenever a plaintiff can
allege that statutorily irrelevant factors have entered into a deci-
sion not to act, there are by hypothesis such guidelines to control
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
This understanding captures a large number of the cases that
have reviewed agency inaction before Chaney.3 8 Indeed, this is the
ground on which the Chaney Court distinguished and preserved
be enforced), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2385 (1984).
134 That there may be nonjurisdictional reasons for failing to act is not relevant here.
Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92-94 (1943), a court may not uphold an agency
decision on grounds not articulated by the agency.
135 See supra note 122.
13s See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(prohibiting EPA from considering costs in setting lead standards under Clean Air Act).
137 105 S. Ct. at 1656.
13s See supra notes 2-4.
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Dunlop v. Bachowski.139 The same conclusion is appropriate when-
ever the plaintiff has alleged that irrelevant factors have influenced
the decision " or that inaction is inconsistent with statutory con-
straints on enforcement discretion.
D. "Abdication" of Statutory Duty or a "Pattern" of Nonen-
forcement
In a number of cases in recent years, the courts have reviewed
claims that agencies have abdicated their statutory obligations by
failing to undertake enforcement action in a substantial category of
cases. The most celebrated of these decisions, Adams v. Richard-
son, involved an alleged failure to enforce Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. According to the court, abdication of authority
to enforce the statute was subject to judicial review. Adams was
cited with apparent approval in Chaney.1 42
The question remains why a "pattern" of nonenforcement, or
"abdication" of statutory duty, should be treated differently from
an isolated decision not to act. At least some of the factors referred
to by the Chaney Court apply in both contexts. But the difference
lies in a differing assessment of congressional intent, and thus of
available "law to apply," in the two categories of cases. For exam-
ple, if an agency announces that it will no longer enforce a particu-
lar statute-to take an extreme case-it is not difficult to conclude,
at least as a general rule, that this decision is contrary to the will
of the legislature that enacted the statute. Such a decision raises
the possibility that the executive's inaction is based on its underly-
ing disagreement with the goals of the statute and thus on execu-
tive usurpation of the legislative function.4 3 With an isolated fail-
13 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
110 This conclusion assumes that the agency has made some decision not to act. If there
is no "decision," judicial relief should generally be unavailable in the absence of statutory
requirements for action. Such requirements may take the form of statutory deadlines, which
render delay in enforcement actionable. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)
(1982) (setting deadline for EPA issuance of air quality criteria). The use of deadlines is a
familiar example of legislative action creating an active role for judicial review.
14 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Adams litigation has had a complex history.
See Note, Judicial Control of Systemic Inadequacies in Federal Administrative Enforce-
ment, 88 YALE L.J. 407, 423-25 (1978). For the latest episode, see Women's Equity Action
League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (remanding for consideration of issue of stand-
ing, raised by the court sua sponte, in light of Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984)).
"" 105 S. Ct. at 1656 n.4 (noting that the governing statute might constrain discretion
in such a case).
13 Traditions of prosecutorial discretion have served, in the criminal context, as a safe-
guard against enforcement of outmoded or unpopular statutory prohibitions. Congress or a
state legislature need not repeal such proscriptions; in the enforcement process, prosecutors
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ure to act, it is difficult to draw that conclusion.
While the principal characteristic of a "pattern" of nonen-
forcement or "abdication" is a refusal to act in a large number of
cases, an approach based on sheer magnitude is incomplete. If the
agency's jurisdiction is extensive, a refusal to act in a large number
of cases might be the result of legitimate processes of setting pri-
orities in light of the pertinent statutory standards. To conclude
that abdication has occurred, it may therefore be necessary to find
that the refusal to act applies in a large number of cases weighed
against the total jurisdiction of the agency under the relevant
statute.
Of course, it will not always be easy to tell whether a particu-
lar case falls in the category of "abdication" or of isolated refusal
to act. The plaintiffs in Chaney might have argued that their
claims belonged to the former category. The argument would be
unavailing, however, in light of the breadth of the enforcement op-
portunities before the FDA-opportunities of which the inmates'
claim was but a small part. Of course, hard intermediate cases will
inevitably arise, but here as elsewhere, the existence of such cases
is not a reason to abandon an otherwise sensible distinction.
E. Refusal to Enforce Agency Regulations
A refusal to enforce an agency regulation is different from a
refusal to enforce a statute in the important sense that in the for-
mer context, the principal basis for judicial intervention appears
unavailable. That basis, as we have seen, is agency action-or inac-
tion-that is inconsistent with "law," understood to mean the stat-
ute that Congress enacted. When failure to act violates a duty im-
posed on the executive branch by Congress, separation-of-powers
concerns counsel in favor of, not against, an aggressive judicial
role.
The matter is different when an agency complies with the will
of Congress but refuses to enforce its own voluntarily adopted reg-
ulation. To be sure, there is a general principle requiring agencies
may achieve most of the benefits of a repeal through refusal to enforce. Recognition of a
private right to initiate administrative action might remove this safeguard and intrude on
desirable prosecutorial flexibility. To a large extent, however, the executive's authority to
allocate limited prosecutorial resources to the most egregious violations should ensure that
most inaction under obsolescent statutes will survive review. See supra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text (discussing resource limitations as a basis for deference). Moreover, in
some contexts the appropriate remedy for obsolescence is repeal by the legislature. And in
any event, the dangers of effective repeal of statutes through executive inaction outweigh
the risks produced by diminished flexibility.
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to follow their regulations.""' If a regulation evinces an intention to
require an agency to act or otherwise to confine its enforcement
discretion, this principle may in most instances be invoked by pri-
vate parties.' 45 The Chaney Court left open the possibility that a
regulation that obligates an agency to act might provide "law to
apply" in the same way as does a statute.14
Nonetheless, the fact that a regulation indicates that certain
private conduct is unlawful does not, in and of itself, impose on the
agency any duty of enforcement. Such a regulation does not pur-
port to require the agency to act but only sets out standards to
guide regulated class members and regulatory beneficiaries. A fail-
ure to enforce such a regulation should not be grounds for judicial
intervention. In short, the difference is between a regulation that
purports to bind an agency to undertake certain enforcement ac-
tions and a regulation that merely describes what conduct is un-
lawful under a statutory program.
F. Failure to Initiate Rulemaking
In an important opinion by Judge McGowan, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted judicial review of
a decision not to promulgate a rule.147 The court emphasized that
such review should be unusually deferential,. 48 but said that in cer-
tain cases decisions not to issue rules might be reversed. A later
decision applied this reasoning to allow review of failure to initiate
rulemaking proceedings.' 4 These decisions are thrown into ques-
tion by Chaney. Many of the considerations that justify refusal to
144 See, e.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932)
(regulatory agency may not ignore its own quasi-legislative pronouncements); Nader v.
Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1974) (Watergate special-prosecutor regulation has
force and effect of law and binds its issuer); Note, Violation by Agencies of Their Own
Regulations, 87 HARv. L. REv. 629 (1974) (examining interests supporting requirement that
agencies observe their own rules).
15 Once a rule is found to have been made pursuant to a proper statutory authoriza-
tion, as will be the case for most rules, the question is whether the rule creates judicially
enforceable private rights. See, e.g., Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228,
236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Brown v. Lynn, 392 F. Supp. 559, 562
(N.D. I. 1978). But cf. Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1332 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980) (doubting whether executive order may deny private rights
of action and thus make itself unenforceable).
140 See 105 S. Ct. at 1658.
147 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
148 Id. at 1047 (such cases amenable to "at least a minimal level of judicial scrutiny").
149 WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (availability of review ac-
knowledged, but its scope said to be necessarily narrow).
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review in that case are applicable in cases involving a refusal to
issue a rule or to initiate rulemaking proceedings.
There are two grounds on which one might contend that judi-
cial review should be available for refusals to initiate rulemaking.
The first would rely on the legislative history of the APA. The
Senate committee report said that the "refusal of an agency to
grant the petition [for rulemaking] or to hold rulemaking proceed-
ings . . . would not per se be subject to judicial reversal."'150 This
language has been read to mean that generally such refusals would
be subject to review and at least sometimes to reversal. 1 1 But the
language probably cannot bear that weight. It is an isolated state-
ment in the legislative history; it is contradicted by the influential
report of the Attorney General on the APA;152 and, perhaps most
important, it is too ambiguous to support a general rule of
reviewability.
The second ground for seeking review of a decision to deny
rulemaking petitions is more plausible. A refusal to initiate
rulemaking should be reviewable if there is "law to apply" in light
of the allegation measured against the substantive statutory stan-
dard. Here as elsewhere, the reviewability of inaction will turn on
whether the statute provides constraints on the agency's failure to
act in the particular circumstances. Significantly, a refusal to en-
gage in rulemaking is likely to affect a broader range of people
than is an isolated enforcement decision; such a refusal is therefore
more likely to implicate the concerns associated with a pattern of
nonenforcement.
A recent example is provided by Community Nutrition Insti-
tute v. Young.' 53 The case involved an effort to require the FDA to
ban the use of aflatoxins, carcinogenic substances. The relevant
statute reads:
Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, ex-
cept where such substance is required in the production
thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice,
shall be deemed to be unsafe...; but when such substance is
so required or cannot be so avoided, the Secretary shall pro-
150 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACTm. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 201 (1946) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]), quoted in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (emphasis
added by the court).
151 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 n.14 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
"' See LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 229-30.
153 757 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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mulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon
to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of pub-
lic health, and any quantity exceeding the limits so fixed shall
also be deemed to be unsafe .... 154
According to the court, the word "shall" was indicative of a con-
gressional instruction, established as well by the statutory struc-
ture and history, to establish a tolerance level for foods with una-
voidable poisonous or deleterious substances. 155 The FDA was
therefore required to issue the regulation in question.
Whether or not the court's interpretation of the statute was
correct, its approach is entirely consistent with Chaney and sug-
gests a more general principle. Some statutes may require agencies
to undertake enforcement action, including rulemaking, in certain
circumstances. When a court vindicates such requirements, it is
acting consistently with the APA.
G. Generalized Arbitrariness
An allegation that an agency has acted arbitrarily because it
has failed to take action against a particular violation of the gov-
erning statute presents the weakest claim for reviewability. Such
cases implicate all the concerns emphasized by the Chaney Court
about judicial involvement in the allocation of scarce prosecutorial
resources.
The matter may be different if the plaintiff is able to make a
persuasive showing, in light of the statutory standard, that the vio-
lation in question poses an especially powerful case for regulatory
action. Assume, for example, that a plaintiff can demonstrate that
a particular substance causes special risks to life and health and
that the costs of inaction are substantial in terms of both.1 6 Such
a demonstration may be sufficient to justify review of enforcement
decisions, for the situation has features in common both with inac-
tion in violation of statutory standards and with inaction that
amounts to abdication of statutory authority. Cases in which re-
14 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982).
155 757 F.2d at 357-58. At the same time, a statute that is phrased in permissive
terms-stating, for example, than an agency "may" act in a category of cases-should not
immunize inaction from review. In some circumstances, inaction may be based on factors
that are impermissible under even "permissive" statutes. Decisions resting on impermissible
factors are unlawful even if the agency has discretion not to act when the proper factors are
taken into account.
'2' See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594-95
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (plaintiffs utilized EPA findings of dangerousness of DDT as basis for re-
view of EPA inaction).
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view is justified under this rationale should, however, be relatively
rare in light of the difficulty of assessing the agency's enforcement
program that such review would entail.
CONCLUSION
The trend in the direction of judicial review of agency inaction
is a salutary one. That trend is in keeping with the general move-
ment of modern public law, which has increasingly abandoned the
assumption that reviewing courts should act on the basis of a pre-
sumption against government regulation. The rise of the modern
regulatory state results in large part from an understanding that
government "inaction" is itself a decision and may have serious ad-
verse consequences for affected citizens. It should not be surprising
to find that judicial doctrines have moved in the same direction.
In the modern era, the judicial role is to ensure the identifica-
tion and implementation of statutory values and to guard against
factional power over the regulatory process. That role applies re-
gardless of whether the agency is increasing or decreasing the
scope of regulation. Judicial review is, to be sure, only one of a
number of mechanisms for controlling agency performance, and it
has serious disadvantages. Exclusive reliance must not be placed
on the courts.157 But judicial review has served as an important
source of constraints on administrative action. Whatever the de-
fects of judicial review, they do not justify a one-way ratchet
against regulation, which may skew regulatory processes in direc-
tions inconsistent with the governing statute.
Notwithstanding these considerations, Heckler v. Chaney, the
Court's first major encounter with the problem in the last decade,
presented a weak case for review. The plaintiff's allegation, mea-
sured against the statutory standard, furnished little basis on
which to assess the legality of the agency's decision not to act. But
the Chaney decision, in keeping with the general direction of lower
court cases over the past decade, made clear that judicial review of
agency inaction is available when the agency's enforcement deci-
sion violates statutory constraints. Over time, one may expect that
understanding to become increasingly prominent, as the problem
of agency inaction is assimilated to the rest of the law governing
judicial review of the conduct of administrative agencies.
1 See supra note 18.
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